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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether specific characteristics of the returns distributions implied by 
options prices constitute useful information for the purpose of predicting changes in market 
direction. The key distributional characteristics we focus on are skewness, kurtosis, and the 
probability weight in the extreme tails of the implied distributions. We present a new methodology 
for extracting the returns distributions and apply it to S&P 500 index futures-options prices for 
twenty days surrounding the four largest market reversals in calendar 2001. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
n modern theoretical option pricing models, option prices are discounted expectations of future 
outcomes for the underlying. To the extent that transaction prices for options follow option-pricing 
theory, option prices are expressions of the market’s aggregate expectations. Thus, an instantaneous 
set of prices of call and/or put options with the same underlying asset and maturity across a wide range of strike 
prices gives a very direct indication of market participants’ aggregate view of outcomes for the underlying on that 
maturity date.  For example, if the prices of deep out-of-the-money (“OTM”) put options are relatively large 
compared to deep OTM call options, this may imply that the market is placing more probability weight on a 
downward movement in the price of the underlying than on an upward movement. Conversely, prices of OTM calls 
that are relatively high compared to OTM puts could be interpreted as an indication that the market expects an 
upward movement in the price of the underlying. 
 
Bates (1991) examined the S&P 500 index futures option prices for evidence of expectations of the market 
crash in October 1987.  The market showed the following movement prior to the crash: from October 1986 to 
August 1987, the market experienced a 42% upsurge, reaching its peak on the 27
th
 of August.  After the peak it 
exhibited a gradual decline with fluctuations until the crash.  Bates found that OTM put options on S&P 500 futures 
traded unusually higher than OTM calls during the period of the market upsurge. This manifestation of “an 
expectation (or fear) of a market crash” became pronounced in July and August of 1987, subsided near the market’s 
peak in late August, and disappeared with the market’s decline until the crash.  These observations led Bates to 
argue that the October 1987 crash was expected, notwithstanding that the expectation appeared to manifest itself two 
months prior to the occurrence of the crash. 
  
Two possible lines of inquiry present themselves. The first is that option prices may contain information 
about future market moves that can be extracted and exploited by trading strategies. The second is that market 
fluctuations may be an artifact of market participants’ sentiments after the occurrence of a sustained upward or 
downward move in the market.  The line of reasoning with respect to this latter issue is as follows. If Bates’ finding 
is characteristic not just of the period 1986-1987, but of stock markets in general, then accumulations of market 
moves in one direction arguably carry with them a decreasing expectation among market participants of a 
continuation of the trend, and an increasing expectation of a reversal. This raises the possibility that market 
fluctuations are a result of self-fulfilling prophecies in the sense that they are caused by trading strategies that are 
motivated by the expectation of a reversal rather than by a change in market fundamentals or firm specific 
fundamentals. In other words, market movements themselves generate fluctuating expectations, which in turn 
generate market fluctuations.  
I 
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This study investigates the relationship between market expectations and subsequent market reversals.  
Specifically, it investigates market expectations implied by call option prices on the days immediately before 
changes in market trends, and examines whether changes in expectations coincide with realized reversals in trends.  
If expectations impounded in option prices represent a useful processing of information by market participants, or if 
market fluctuations are driven to a material extent by market sentiments as reflected in option prices, then one 
should find in option prices the expectation of a downturn before the occurrence of a downturn, and the expectation 
of an upturn before the occurrence of an upturn.   
   
Like Bates’, this study estimates market expectations using probability distributions implicit in S&P 500 
index futures option prices.  Unlike Bates’, who retrieves probability distributions using a model for pricing options 
with a jump diffusion process, we used a state-claim-pricing approach
1
 to recover the market participants’ aggregate 
probability density functions of S&P 500 futures prices. 
   
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief literature review and theoretical 
development. Nest we present our methodology, and describe the data we use in this study.  Finally, we present the 
results and conclude. 
 
Literature Review and Theoretical Development 
 
The development of option pricing theory and the fact that, for some underlyings (e.g. market indices), a 
wide range of strike prices and maturities are traded enable us to use observed option prices to specify the returns 
distributions that ostensibly motivate the option prices. One can argue that these returns distributions reflect the 
market’s expectations concerning future outcomes for the underlying. Without our current level of understanding of 
option prices and the rich set of data that is available from well-organized public option markets, accurate estimation 
of market expectations would be very difficult. For example, Shiller (1989) used a survey method to look for 
evidence of expectations of the October 1987 crash.  Most individual and institutional respondents said they had 
thought prior to the crash that the market was overpriced, however Shiller’s methodology makes these results 
vulnerable to the criticism that they were biased by hindsight.  
  
One well-known metric for quantifying market expectations is the Black-Scholes (1973) implied volatility 
curve. In this context, implied volatility is the volatility value that, when used in the Black-Scholes option pricing 
expression together with the rest of the model’s parameters, returns the desired option price. The implied volatility 
curve is a plot of Black-Scholes implied volatility against strike price for a set of options on a common underlying 
and with a common maturity date, but with different strike prices. If observed option prices were to adhere perfectly 
to the assumptions in the Black-Scholes model the implied volatility curve would be constant across strike prices. In 
practice either (or both) tails of the curve can be upward sloping or downward sloping. The curve is sometimes 
called the “volatility smile”. The extent to which the implied volatility curve deviates from the flat curve implied by 
the Black-Scholes model is sometimes used as a measure of the extent to which probability mass in the tails of the 
returns distribution deviates from the normal density function. Disproportionate mass in the right tail can be 
construed as a market expectation of an upturn in the underlying and disproportionate mass in the left tail can be 
construed as a market expectation of a downturn.
2
 
 
One can also examine the condition of market expectations by comparing of the price of an out-of-the-
money (“OTM”) European style put option to the price of an OTM European style call option, where both options 
are written on the same underlying and have the same maturity date. The approach argues that OTM put options 
reflect conditions in the lower tail of the risk-neutral distribution of the underlying asset price, and OTM call options 
reflect conditions in the upper tail.  Comparison of the put price to the call price, where the strike prices of each are 
spaced symmetrically around )(E TS under the risk-neutral measure, provides information concerning the symmetry 
or asymmetry of the risk-neutral distribution. The distribution is symmetric when OTM puts and calls are equally 
priced.  It is negatively skewed when OTM put prices exceed OTM call prices, suggesting that the market expects a 
downturn in the price of the underlying asset.  It is positively skewed when OTM call prices exceed OTM put prices, 
suggesting that the market expects an upturn in the price of the underlying asset.  
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                           Volume 3, Number 10 
 19 
Bates (1991) uses a comparison of OTM puts to OTM calls to test the hypothesis that the October 1987 
crash was expected.  Using transaction prices of S&P 500 futures options over the period 1985-1987, he measured 
skewness premia – the percentage deviation of x% OTM call prices from x% OTM put prices.  He found that 
starting late in 1986, the market’s strong assessment of downside risk (negative skewness premia) began emerging 
as stock prices started to soar in July and August 1987 reaching their the peak on the 27
th
 of August.  Bates found 
that in the first week of August 1987, 4% OTM puts were about 25% more expensive than corresponding OTM 
calls.  After that, negative skewness premia subsided as stock prices reached their peak and disappeared when stock 
prices began to decline after August 27
th
.  
  
Bates also fitted a jump-diffusion model to daily options prices during 1987 and retrieved the market’s 
subjective probability density functions of S&P 500 futures implicit in call and put options on the futures.  Negative 
skewness emerged in implicit distributions in October 1986, as stock prices started increasing.  Negative skewness 
became most pronounced in June-August 1987, concurrent with stock prices approaching their peak, and subsided 
markedly when the prices hit their peak and started decline.  Moreover, expected negative jumps per year implicit in 
prices of a primitive security that pays off $1 in the event of a jump occurring within the interval (t, tt  ] and $0 
otherwise highlighted that crash fears became strongest as the stock prices were reaching their peak.  These 
observations led him to hypothesize that the US stock market crashed in October 1987 because it was expected to 
crash: the crash was a self-fulfilling prophecy – a “rational bubble”. 
Following the Bates’s study, Rappoport and White (1994) examined whether the crash of 1929 was 
expected. Although there were no well-organized options markets in the 1920’s, there was a very active market in 
brokers’ loans collateralized by stock.  Rappoport and White cast brokers’ loans as options written by lenders and 
bought by borrowers, and investigated market expectations using those pseudo-options prices. Unlike Bates, who 
retrieved implied probability distributions and measured “a fear of crash“ through skewness, Rappoport and White 
assessed the crash fear through return volatilities implied by the options (loans) prices calculated using the Black-
Scholes and the knockout option pricing models.  They found that implied volatilities rose sharply coinciding with 
the stock market boom (before the crash).  In addition, the interest premia and the margin demanded on the 
brokerage loans rose sharply during the stock market boom and returned to their pre-1929 levels immediately after 
the crash.   
 
In 1929, stock prices had continued to soar until immediately before the crash. Rappoport and White found 
that the fear of a crash grew up to the moment of the crash.  Bates found that in 1987 stock prices peaked two 
months before the crash. After the peak, prices started to decline and then the crash occurred.  Bates found that the 
fear of a crash grew until one week before stock prices peaked and then the fear subsided during the week before the 
peak and disappeared when prices started to decline.  These two results are consistent in the sense that an increase in 
the market’s expectation of a downward movement in stock prices arose coincident with an up-surge in stock prices, 
and decreased or disappeared coincident with a decline in stock prices. The studies are inconsistent, however, in the 
sense that the timing of the development and dissipation of crash fears differed markedly. This inconsistency leads 
us to question which pattern might exist in today’s markets. In addition, the question arises as to whether or not the 
evolution of the magnitude of crash fears can be tracked and used to predict changes in market direction for changes 
other than just negative changes, and for changes that are less dramatic than the 1929, and 1987 crashes. Also, 
unlike Bates’ study that used an option-pricing model with a jump diffusion process to retrieve implicit probability 
distributions, this study uses a state claim pricing approach. Whereas Bates’ study assumes that the stock prices 
follow a jump-diffusion process, this study makes no assumption concerning the stochastic evolution of asset prices 
beyond that implied by the assumption that call options are be priced as the discounted expectation: 
 
 KTSKTSTtBtC Qt  )(|)(E),()( .                (1) 
 
In (1), C(t) is call option price, B(t,T) is the price of a zero-coupon riskless bond at time t that pays one 
dollar at time T, 
Q
tE denotes an expectation operator under the risk neutral measure at time t, S(T) is asset price at 
time T, and K is the strike price specified in the option contract. Following arguments analogous to those made in 
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Breeden and Litzenberber (1978), we define   S T( )  as the density function of S(T) conditional on S(t) under the 
measure Q, and restate (1) as follows: 
 
   
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K
TdSTSKTSTtBtC )()()(),()(  .                       (2) 
 
Differentiating (2) twice with respect to K gives: 
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In other words, the second derivative of option price with respect to strike price returns the probability density 
function of asset price on a present value basis. Dividing both sides by B(t,T) we obtain the following expression for 
the density function: 
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We implement (4) in the same manner as in Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) using a numerical second derivative 
with respect to strike price: 
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Defining 
)(),( tTreTtB  , and, 
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and letting XXX i 1 , XX i  , and XXX i 1 , then: 
 
),,()( )( XTXceXP tTri 

                (7) 
 
 We provide details of our process for implementing this approach in the following section. 
 
Shimko (1991) and Neave and Ross (2001) also use Breeden and Litzenberger’s approach to obtaining 
probability density functions from option prices. Shimko recovered probability distributions of OEX index values 
implied by OEX index call option prices for the period January 1987 to December 1989. To obtain option prices 
sufficiently closely spaced in the strike price dimension to take useful numerical second derivatives, Shimko 
inverted the observed option prices into strike-price/implied volatility space and regressed the implied volatilities 
against strike prices and their squares to estimate a functional expression for the implied volatilities. He then used 
the estimated functional expression for volatility to fill in gaps in the option price observations. While this study 
adopts this general approach, it was our view that Shimko’s second order polynomial for implied volatility did not 
fit sufficiently well to the observed implied volatilities. For this reason, this study uses a Hermite polynomial to 
model the functional form of the implied volatilities. 
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                           Volume 3, Number 10 
 21 
Shimko’s study examined information contained in the retrieved probability distributions.  He found that 
lagged changes in the mean of the implied distribution could be used to predict future changes in the index value. 
Moreover, he found that changes in the mean of the implied distribution co-varied closely with changes in the 
underlying index value, and that the mean of the implied distribution was significantly negatively correlated with the 
volatility of the distribution.  This suggests that volatility tends to drop when the index rises. 
   
Similar findings were obtained in Neave and Ross.  Neave and Ross retrieved implied probability 
distributions for four specific days using observations for call options on S&P 500 index futures for the period 
January 1 to May 31, 2000. They found that the variances of the implied distributions were largest when the means 
of the distributions were low, and the variances were smallest when the means were high.  
 
This study seeks to retrieve probability density functions from option prices for the purpose of examining 
the key properties of the density functions (mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis). In addition, we propose to 
examine the behaviour of the probability density assigned by the market to the tails of the density functions 
dependent on whether a market downturn or upturn is imminent, or has just occurred. 
 
Methodology 
 
We selected four dates on which local extrema occurred by inspection of the graph of S&P 500 index levels 
for calendar 2001. Although it would be desirable to include more “events” in the study, we limited the selection to 
four due to resource constraints.
3
  We elected to examine two “market highs”, which occurred on January 30 and 
May 21, and two “market-lows”, which occurred on April 4 and September 24. We also included September 10, 
2001 to obtain a reading of the market on the day before the World Trade Center tragedy. The graph of S&P 500 
index levels in Figure 1 depicts the days we selected and the movements in the index level around those dates.  
 
 
Figure 1 
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In addition to selecting four local extrema, we also considered the information content of option prices on 
the two days before and the two days after the critical dates. Table 1 sets out the dates we considered. 
 
 
Table 1 
Dates Before and After Market Shifts 
 
Local
Local maxima Extreme
January/February 26 29 30 31 1
May 17 18 21 22 23
Local minimua
April 2 3 4 5 6
September 19 20 21 24 25
Dates Before Dates After
 
 
According to the theory set out above, one can construct a close approximation to a probability density 
function of returns on the underlying if one possesses a sufficient number of option prices for a particular maturity at 
closely spaced strike price intervals. In practice, one faces three main difficulties. The first is that there is the 
potential for observation error in option prices. Even though observed option prices may meet all of the usual no-
arbitrage conditions (see the section on Data) there may be variations in prices from one strike price to the next that 
can introduce material error in a second derivative taken numerically using transactions data. The second is that the 
strike prices that are traded in the market are sometimes too far apart to permit one to take meaningful numerical 
second derivatives with respect to strike price. The third is that traded options span a finite range of strike prices. In 
the absence of traded strike prices corresponding to the tails of the assumed probability density function of returns, 
one cannot use option prices directly to define the nature of the density function outside of the range of traded strike 
prices. 
 
To solve these problems, and accordingly, to obtain a smooth, interpretable, and reasonably complete 
implied probability density function, the methodology must include a procedure to smooth the observed option 
prices and interpolate between strike prices that are either unobserved
4
 or are too far apart to permit one to determine 
a meaningful numerical second derivative. In order to define the tails of the probability density function, the 
methodology must include a procedure for extrapolating beyond the observed strike prices while ensuring that the 
probability density function integrates to unity. The methodology we use is a variation of the smoothing method 
proposed by Shimko (1991).   
 
Specifically, our methodology included the following steps:   
 
1. For each of the days specified in Table 1 we obtained prices for call options with the shortest traded 
maturity in excess of three weeks for as may strike prices as possible.  This typically amounted to 
approximately forty different strike prices. 
2. For each observed price we computed Black-Scholes implied volatility. Implied volatility is the volatility 
parameter that, when used in the Black-Scholes option pricing expression along with the other parameters 
the pricing algorithm depends on, returns the observed option price. 
3. We regressed the implied volatilities from step 2 against orthonormal Hermite polynomials of strike prices 
in order to obtain an implied volatility function, )(ˆ X ,5   
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where X  = strike price, ˆ  = smoothed implied volatility estimated from the function, and, )(
~
XH j  = jth 
orthonormal Hermite polynomials of X. 
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The fitted implied volatility functions typically possessed 
2R  greater than 97%. 
 
4. We used the estimated implied volatility function to generate a smooth and closely spaced set of option 
prices that we used to take the needed numerical second derivatives of option price with respect to strike 
price of the form: 
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Thinking of XXX i 1 , XX i  , and XXX i 1 , then: 
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  More specifically, we used the estimated implied volatility function to generate spot estimates of implied 
volatility. We then used the spot estimates of implied volatility in the Black-Scholes option pricing expression to 
obtain option price estimates for closely spaced strike prices. Use of the Black-Scholes option pricing expression 
does not mean that the methodology is based on the assumption that the Black-Scholes model holds. Rather, it arises 
because we elected to smooth option prices in implied volatility-strike price space and therefore must use the Black-
Scholes option pricing expression to invert the smoothed implied volatilities back into option price-strike price 
space.  
 
5. We examined each implied probability density function to ensure it integrated to 
)( tTre  , or equivalently, 
to unity on a future value basis, or more specifically that: 
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Because discussions of skewness and kurtosis are generally conducted in the context of the probability 
density functions of returns, we defined each observation as  0/ln FXx ii   where 0F  is the futures price at 
time zero, and calculated the moments of the returns distribution in the following ways: 
  

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 The skewness of the probability density function of returns is defined as: 
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The kurtosis of the probability density function of returns is defined as: 
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Our expectations concerning the moments of the distribution are as follows: 
 
1 :  The mean of the distribution if options are priced according to the risk neutral measure should be the 
riskless interest rate. We expect the mean of the distributions  we recover from options prices to reflect this; 
2 :  The stylised facts of returns distributions suggest that volatility following negative moves in the price of the 
underlying tends to increase and volatility following positive moves tends to decrease. We expect to 
observe this phenomenon in the distributions we recover; and, 
3 :  Skewness is a measure of the extent to which there is more probability weight on outcomes in the extreme 
left (negative skewness) or right (positive skewness) tail of a distribution. We expect more negative 
skewness before a downturn and for this negative skewness to reverse itself after the downturn has 
occurred. We expect less negative skewness before an upturn and for this to reverse itself after the upturn 
has occurred. 
 
Our expectations concerning the behaviour of the probability weight in the tails of the distributions are as 
follows: 
 
a) we expect the market to place relatively more probability weight in the left tail of the probability 
distribution  before a downturn and for this excess weighting to reverse itself after the downturn has 
occurred; and, 
b) we expect the market to place relatively less weight in the left tail of the distribution before an upturn and 
for this excess weighting to reverse itself after the upturn has occurred. 
 
Data 
 
This study uses price data for call options written on S&P 500 index futures, and the prices of the 
corresponding futures for four selected days in 2001 as well as the two days before and two days after each of the 
selected days. In addition, we used data for September 10
th, 2001. We elected to use options on index futures (“index 
futures options”) rather than options written on the index (“index options”) because index futures options are traded 
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                           Volume 3, Number 10 
 25 
for a broader range of strike prices than is the case for the latter. Contracts are available for strike prices at 5-point 
intervals for contracts maturing within two months, which are the options of interest in this study. We obtained daily 
observations of S&P 500 index futures prices and index futures options prices for the dates indicated in Table 1 from 
the Financial Post newspaper.  We used the mid-point of the bid-ask US Treasury bill quote for the maturity nearest 
the maturity of the options under consideration as a proxy for the riskless interest rate.
6
  We obtained the quotes 
from the Wall Street Journal. 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether or not short maturity index options contain information 
concerning the distributions of returns that can be used to predict short-term changes in the level of the index. The 
study naturally requires limiting the maturity of options it uses to the shorter end of the maturity spectrum. Although 
this is the case, very short maturity options tend to include relatively little information concerning returns 
distributions. We therefore arbitrarily elected to use the shortest maturity available to us on any given day provided 
that the maturity exceeded three weeks. In practice, this means using options with three to four weeks to maturity in 
some cases and options with three to seven weeks to maturity in the rest of the cases. 
  
We excluded option prices that imply arbitrage opportunities.  More specifically, we excluded the 
following:
7
 
 
a) options with prices less than intrinsic value; 
b) options with prices less than the price of an otherwise identical option with a higher strike price;  
c) for pairs of otherwise identical call option contracts, cases in which the difference in the values 
exceeded the difference in their strike prices; 
d) for three otherwise identical calls with strike prices 3X > 2X > 1X , cases in which the value of 
the middle call exceeded the weighted average of the values of the first and the third calls, where 
the weights are )/()( 1323 XXXX   for the first call and )/()( 1312 XXXX   for the 
third call.  In other words, violation of the proposition,  
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If the strike-price intervals in (22) are identical, it can be re-written as,  
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 Violation of the proposition in (23) results in a negative value for the numerical second derivative of call 
option price with respect to strike price, or, equivalently, a negative value in the probability density function.    
 
The options on S&P 500 index futures are American although we treat them in this study as if they were 
European.  This is equivalent to the assumption that the early exercise premia are negligible. This assumption 
appears to be reasonable because S&P 500 index futures do not pay dividends and it is never optimal to exercise an 
American-style call option before maturity in such cases.   
 
Results 
 
We used the data described in the preceding section to estimate implied volatility functions for 21 days in 
calendar 2001. An example of a graph depicting the implied volatility data points and the fitted curves is included in 
Appendix A. In all cases the 
2R  values in the estimations of the implied volatility functions exceeded 97 %. In 18 
of the 21 cases examined the 
2R  values exceeded 99%. Appendix B sets out an example of a returns probability 
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density functions that was implied by the option prices we observed for a particular day in the study. We include for 
reference a graph of a normal density function with the mean and volatility parameters set equal to those of the 
implied density function for the day. The results for the mean of the distribution are set out in Table 2. Further 
properties of the implied density functions are summarized in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 2 
Short Term Interest Rates 
 
Days Riskless Actual Riskless Actual Riskless Actual Riskless Actual
-11 - - - 3.360% 1.827%
-2 5.010% -2.752% 4.750% 5.079% 3.360% -2.148% 2.150% 1.853%
-1 4.960% -3.698% 4.840% 4.397% 3.370% -1.897% 1.970% 1.724%
0 4.900% -3.828% 4.840% 6.212% 3.420% -3.723% 2.095% 1.933%
1 4.920% -4.032% 4.870% -0.926% 3.390% -3.473% 2.375% 2.065%
2 4.610% -5.587% 4.700% 1.123% 3.460% -2.147% 2.495% 2.126%
January April May September
 
 
 
Perhaps most noteworthy among our findings is the fluctuating behaviour of the mean. Table 2 presents a 
comparison of the realised means and the riskless interest rates corresponding to the maturity of the options in 
question. Our expectation was that the mean would track the riskless rate of return. This expectation was grounded 
in the maintained hypothesis that options are priced under the risk-neutral measure. As it turns out, the means were 
consistently negative before a downturn and consistently positive before an upturn. In a qualitative sense, the means 
before upturns were similar to the riskless rate of return. 
 
 As can be seen from Table 3, results for volatility were mixed. For the January and May downturns and the 
April upturn there was little evidence that volatility changed on the happening of the event. For the September 
upturn, volatility appears to have declined markedly. 
 
 Results for skewness appear to be reactive rather than predictive of market moves. For the January 
downturn skewness increased after the event. It appears that rather than anticipating the event, the market responded 
to it with an increased “crash fear”. For the April upswing, the market appears to have been reactive once again. The 
April 3, 2001 observation at –2.36 may have been an outlier. In any event, the April 2, 2001 observation was –1, 
somewhat less than the observations of –1.15 and –1.07 after the event. For the May event, the market again appears 
be reactive with crash fears increasing after the downturn. The results for the September event are somewhat 
inconsistent with crash fears increasing substantially after the upturn following September 21. 
 
 We used the implied density functions to estimate the tail probabilities in the implied distributions. 
Arguably, the tail probabilities reflect the likelihood of extreme moves in the underlying. In one case we considered 
moves one standard deviation from the mean, and in the second case 1.28 standard deviations form the mean. In the 
latter case, this corresponds to 10% probability weight in the tails of the unit normal density function. 
 
 For the January event the distributions reflected more weight in the left tail after the event once again 
suggesting that options prices are reactive rather than predictive of a market shift. For the April upswing, left tail 
probabilities declined somewhat. For the May downturn, the market reacted much as it did for the April upswing 
suggesting that there is little to be gained by attempting to predict market moves through this metric. Similarly for 
the September upswing the market sentiment appeared somewhat less that unequivocal. 
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Table 3 
Properties of the Implied 
Probability Density Functions 
 
Days to Excess
Maturity Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Left tail Right tail Ratio
Panel A - Downturn
26-Jan-01 15 -2.75% 7.50% 22.11% -1.68 8.82 44.9% 55.3% 0.81
29-Jan-01 14 -3.70% 7.00% 22.53% -1.78 10.09 45.4% 54.8% 0.83
30-Jan-01 13 -3.83% 7.49% 22.49% -1.81 10.67 45.4% 54.8% 0.83
31-Jan-01 12 -4.03% 8.37% 22.56% -1.99 12.24 45.0% 55.1% 0.82
1-Feb-01 11 -5.59% 7.98% 21.88% -2.56 18.89 44.5% 55.8% 0.80
Panel B - Upswing
2-Apr-01 14 5.08% 11.39% 30.24% -1.00 3.27 45.3% 54.4% 0.83
3-Apr-01 13 4.40% 16.30% 37.39% -2.36 19.80 43.5% 56.3% 0.77
4-Apr-01 12 6.21% 13.45% 34.40% -1.07 3.83 45.3% 54.4% 0.83
5-Apr-01 11 -0.93% 8.51% 30.34% -1.15 5.38 46.0% 54.0% 0.85
6-Apr-01 10 1.12% 11.54% 32.27% -1.07 4.48 45.7% 54.2% 0.84
Panel C - Downturn
17-May-01 21 -2.15% 5.40% 21.64% -1.45 7.45 45.5% 54.7% 0.83
18-May-01 20 -1.90% 5.66% 20.84% -1.52 7.75 30.3% 69.8% 0.43
21-May-01 19 -3.72% 4.79% 20.94% -1.74 9.94 45.7% 54.6% 0.84
22-May-01 18 -3.47% 4.72% 21.14% -1.74 9.98 45.3% 54.9% 0.82
23-May-01 17 -2.15% 5.47% 21.22% -1.48 7.82 31.8% 68.4% 0.46
Panel D - Upswing
10-Sep-01 9 1.83% 11.98% 27.88% -1.01 3.92 45.9% 54.1% 0.85
19-Sep-01 22 1.85% 17.81% 42.91% -2.54 15.17 41.2% 58.6% 0.70
20-Sep-01 21 1.72% 21.64% 47.89% -2.30 11.87 40.8% 59.1% 0.69
21-Sep-01 20 1.93% 20.41% 46.16% -2.13 10.54 41.3% 58.5% 0.71
24-Sep-01 19 2.07% 18.38% 40.54% -3.05 23.11 41.2% 58.6% 0.70
25-Sep-01 18 2.13% 16.46% 38.86% -3.48 30.87 41.7% 58.1% 0.72
Probability WeightAnnualized
 
 
 
 While these results to not generally meet with the expectations we set out in the methodology section 
above, they do not rule out the possibility that the observed properties of returns distributions signal changes in 
general market trends. Rather, they suggest that the options market does not respond with the level of precision and 
immediacy that we sought to identify and that is implicit in the research design we used.   
 
 Noteworthy within the reported results is the significant increase in the magnitude of the left tail probability 
versus the right tail probability in the days following the September 11, 2001 tragedy. On September 10
th
 the ratio 
stood at 1.29 (for a 1.28 standard deviation move) versus 2.25 to 2.42 for the period September 19
th
 to 25
th
. This 
shift implies significantly different risk management considerations depending on whether one is on the long or 
short side of the market. 
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Table 4 
Analysis of Tail Probabilities of the 
Implied Probability Density Functions 
 
 
Over the To Option
Left tail Right tail Left tail Right tail Day Ahead Maturity 1.0 SD 1.28 SD
Panel A - Downturn
26-Jan-01 11.9% 11.7% 8.0% 5.8% 0.68% -4.02% 1.02 1.38
29-Jan-01 11.7% 11.5% 7.7% 5.9% 0.70% -4.70% 1.02 1.32
30-Jan-01 11.6% 11.5% 7.8% 5.7% -0.56% -5.40% 1.02 1.35
31-Jan-01 11.6% 11.3% 7.6% 5.5% 0.54% -4.84% 1.03 1.39
1-Feb-01 11.1% 10.6% 7.1% 5.1% -1.76% -5.38% 1.05 1.41
Panel B - Upswing
2-Apr-01 13.3% 13.0% 9.1% 6.8% -3.50% 8.13% 1.02 1.34
3-Apr-01 12.0% 10.8% 8.1% 5.1% -0.29% 11.63% 1.10 1.60
4-Apr-01 13.4% 12.8% 9.0% 6.7% 4.28% 11.93% 1.04 1.35
5-Apr-01 12.6% 12.7% 8.6% 6.8% -2.02% 7.65% 1.00 1.26
6-Apr-01 13.2% 12.9% 8.8% 7.1% 0.81% 9.67% 1.02 1.24
Panel C - Downturn
17-May-01 12.0% 11.7% 8.0% 6.2% 0.27% -5.93% 1.03 1.29
18-May-01 12.2% 11.9% 8.1% 6.2% 1.60% -6.19% 1.02 1.30
21-May-01 11.7% 11.5% 7.6% 6.0% -0.26% -7.80% 1.01 1.27
22-May-01 11.6% 11.6% 7.7% 5.9% -1.56% -7.53% 1.00 1.30
23-May-01 12.3% 12.1% 8.1% 6.3% 0.32% -5.97% 1.02 1.28
Panel D - Upswing
10-Sep-01 13.4% 13.1% 9.1% 7.0% -5.05% -1.76% 1.02 1.29
19-Sep-01 11.2% 9.0% 7.8% 3.3% -3.16% 5.49% 1.24 2.35
20-Sep-01 11.4% 9.1% 8.1% 3.4% -1.92% 8.65% 1.25 2.42
21-Sep-01 11.8% 9.7% 8.3% 3.7% 3.82% 10.57% 1.21 2.25
24-Sep-01 10.6% 8.4% 7.4% 3.2% 0.88% 6.75% 1.26 2.30
25-Sep-01 10.3% 8.2% 7.2% 3.0% -0.52% 5.87% 1.25 2.37
Returns
Left Over Right
Tail Probability Weight
1.0 SD 1.28 SD
Ratios of Tail Probabilities
 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
Bates’s and Rappoport and White found evidence of crash expectations before the 1987 and 1929 crashes 
respectively, although the timing of the emergence and dissipation of the crash expectations varied between the two 
studies. This inconsistency led us to question which pattern might exist in today’s markets. In addition, the question 
arises as to whether or not the evolution of the magnitude of crash fears can be tracked and used to predict changes 
in market direction for changes other than just negative changes, and for changes that are less dramatic than the 
1929, and 1987 crashes. 
 
We examined four market reversals in calendar 2001.  Using the Breeden and Litzenberger’s State-Claim 
Pricing Approach (1978) we recovered the probability distributions implied by the prices of call options written 
against S&P 500 index futures for the date of each reversal as well as the two days before and after each reversal. 
We found that there was no significant evidence that the market was shifting probability weight in the recovered 
probability distributions in anticipation of a market reversal or in response to the occurrence of a reversal. Our most 
significant finding is that a significant shift in the relative magnitudes of the lower tail versus the upper tail of the 
recovered probability distributions occurred following the September 11
th
 tragedy. The shift to the left tail persisted 
even after the market reversal that occurred on September 21
st
. 
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 Suggestions for Future Research: Limitations of this study suggest several areas of further investigations.  
Twenty-one days observation of implied probability distributions might not be sufficient to find a general tendency 
of market expectation.  An observation of distributions for a longer period will provide a more accurate and detailed 
insight concerning the evolution of market expectation. In addition, this study focused on shifts in expectations on 
the days very close to the reversals in the index. A study that considers a wider time frame around a specific event 
might be more revealing. Finally, more work needs to be done to allow one to fully understand the motivation for 
the shift in relative tail probabilities. 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Observed & Fitted Black-Scholes Implied Volatility 
 
 
2R = .997 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. c.f. Breeden and Litzenberger (1978). 
2. There are other explanations for the volatility smile. For example, the constant elasticity of variance model (Cox, 
1975), the leverage models addressed in Geske (1979) and Rubinstein (1983), jump-diffusion models (Merton, 1976), 
and stochastic volatility models (Heston, 1993) can all exhibit volatility smiles that derive from the fact that the 
stochastic process assumptions in these models lead to density functions of returns that deviate from normal. 
3. In a similar study currently underway the authors are examining more individual events. 
4. For example, if traded strike prices are five index points apart, it is possible for an absence of transaction prices to 
occur such that the difference between observed traded strike prices is 10, 15 or more index points apart.  
5. c.f. Press, et al, (1995), or Rice (1964). 
6. Neave and Ross (2001) report that different choices of interest rate have very little impact of estimated value of 
primitive securities, and argue that the particular choice of interest rate is not crucial. 
7. c.f. Cox and Rubinstein (1985). 
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Appendix B: Implied Probability Distribution 
 
Skewness = -1.68 
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